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Many regard elections as a political event. It is one. But then there are a lot of aspects to it. So itâ€™s not just a political event. Itâ€™s more than that. It can be considered as a mathematical event. Thatâ€™s because a lot depends on strategic models. The general public may not be aware. But such models often decide the outcome. And an economics student needs to study about similar models too. Thatâ€™s why one needs **electoral competition with strategic voters homework help**.

It is a common practice to announce policies before votes. Every democratic system experiences that. And these policies have an effect on the public. It helps them decide a narrative. It enables a discourse.

**Electoral systems**

Now electoral systems may vary a little from place to place. But basic majority game stays the same throughout. However, these policies play a major role. Or else, public would just be a robot voting for any single favourite party. But it isnâ€™t like that. People are motivated by policies. Thus they vote strategically. And all this strategy can be put on paper. There are numerous mathematical models that decide outcomes. And these are what **electoral competition with strategic voters assignment help** will teach you.

**Game theory**

The Game theory is one of the most useful theories. It has been widely used to predict outcomes. In fact, election being a competition, game theory is very useful in knowing winners. This game theory helps you predict winners of elections. It is even more useful in policy environments.

**Some equations**

There are some assumptions before defining such mathematical models. Firstly, one has to consider a 1D policy space. And this space is a closed interval.

- So therefore the first important equation is X = [0, 1]. So itâ€™s clear that it is similar to a probability model.
- Assume there are two parties. These are P and Q. And they have their own platforms. So x
_{P}and x_{Q}represent these platforms. Thus, x_{P},x_{Q}â‚¬ - Now these are policy positions. So every voter knows that their votes will have an effect on the outcome.
- And every party, that is k, is motivated by a policy. Therefore there are preferences that are single peaked. So then ÆŸ
_{j}â‚¬ X, ÆŸ_{P }<ÆŸ_{Q}. - So each policy will have an effect. And these effects will have an outcome. If v is the vote share of a party P, policy outcome will be .

So you finally have _{y }(x_{P},x_{Q}) = v^{y}x^{P}/(v^{y} + [1-v]^{y}) + [1-v]^{y}x_{Q}/(v^{y} + [1-v]^{y}).

It has a lot of equations so** electoral competition with strategic voters assignment help** is really crucial.

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